Unified Command: The View after TORCH
Addressing the Academy of Political Science on November 10, 1942, General George C. Marshall offered a survey of the ongoing war effort. During his remarks, however, he singled out the importance of unified command. The Allies had launched Operation TORCH (the invasion of French North Africa) just two days prior, lending Marshall’s words an added measure of significance. Unified command was still an experiment of the first order; his explanation for the concept’s emergence is even more enlightening considering the fact that he himself had been its chief proponent dating back to the ARCADIA Conference in late 1941.
The entire speech is a fantastic lens into the strategic constraints posed by coalition warfare on a global scale, and the difficulties at arriving at agreeable frameworks for command and control among allies, especially at such an early point in the war.
I’m going to reproduce excerpts from his speech here–mostly for my own records but also for anyone who may find value in his perspective. Candidly, I wish I’d stumbled on this speech before I finished my dissertation!
On Unified Command Among the “United Nations”
The question of unity of command among allied nations is therefore pertinent to the occasion. It is a dominating factor in the problem of the United Nations at the present time. Of all the military lessons which could have been learned from the last war, the question of unity of command is probably the most outstanding; personally I learned my lessons in observing the problems of General Pershing in France and the reluctance of our Allies to meet the issue until almost overwhelmed by the Great German offensive of March, 1918.
For that reason the first step taken by the Chiefs of Staff of Great Britain and the United States at the initial meeting in Washington in December, 1941 was to establish a basis for unity of command in the Southwest Pacific together in the quickest possible time for our security forces to meet the carefully prepared Japanese onslaught. The framework and the details of procedure established at that time have furnished a foundation for all combined action between Great Britain and the United States since that date.
In other words, within three weeks of our entry into this war we had organized a system which would provide a working basis for the strategical direction of our war efforts, the allocation of forces and of material, and the coordination of production of munitions. It has of necessity been a vastly complicated problem. The interests of many nations are involved.
Take, for example, the initial problem of establishing unity of command in the Southwest Pacific under General [Archibald] Wavell. The interests, the aspirations, the military forces and the people of the United States, of Great Britain, of the Dutch, the Chinese, the Burmese, the Australians, and the New Zealanders, all have to be considered, and it must be remembered that you cannot reach decisions through a Congress of Nations that will furnish unlimited debates but rarely timely decisions to meet a pressing situation.
In the Southwest Pacific were factors involving the isolation of an American command in the Philippines, the approaching isolation of a British empire command in Malaysia, the threat of the Burma Road, China’s sole line of communication to the outside friendly world, the destruction of the government of the Netherlands East Indies, the threatened invasion of Australia, Portuguese interests in Timor, and our communications with the Far East through the islands of the South Pacific. The distances were tremendous, the racial groups numerous, and the political interests often diverse. In addition, the matter was complicated by problems of shipping, the vital factor of time, and the vast logistical requirements. So, while it is an easy matter to talk of unity of command, it is an extremely difficult matter to arrange on an effective basis.
Despite all of these difficulties the most heartening factor of the War to date, in my opinion, is the remarkable success which has thus far been achieved in coordinating and directing the military and allied interests of the United Nations.
In the past two days we have had a most impressive example of the practicable application of unity of command, an American Expeditionary Force, soldiers, sailors, and aviators, supported by the British fleet, by British flyers and by a British Army, all controlled by an American commander-in-chief, General Eisenhower, with a Deputy Commander also an American Army officer, General Clark. They are served by a combined staff of British and American officers, of soldiers and sailors and aviators. Officers of the British Army and Navy senior to General Eisenhower, men of great distinction and long experience, have, with complete loyalty, subordinated themselves to his leadership. The instructions of the British cabinet to guide their Army commander serving under General Eisenhower furnish a model of readiness of a great nation to cooperate in every practicable manner. I go into detail because this should not be a secret. It will be most depressing news to our enemies. It is the declaration of their doom.
That last line is so good.
Source note: The speech can be found in Box 111, Folder 15 of the George C. Marshall Collection, George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, Virginia.